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REPLY TO APPELLEE'S STATEMENT OF FACTS
Paragraph 2 of Appellees' "Statement of Facts" lacks the context necessary for an
accurate understanding of the matter. The paragraph mentions that Myers entered into a letter
agreement which provided that Myers would act as a "finder" for the Power Companies. It is
important to remember that Myers never held himself out to the Power Companies as a "finder"
or broker. Rather, an agent of the Power Companies sought out Myers and requested that he
help them locate a coal mining company to produce coal from the leases.1

1

Appellees contend that there is no proper support for the conclusion that the Power
Companies actively sought out and solicited Myers' help. (Brief of Appellees at 7, n. 3.)
Myers' Memorandum in Opposition to Motion of Third Party Defendants for Summary
Judgment included the information in 11 of its "Additional Undisputed Material Facts." (R.
829.) The information was supported by a citation to the affidavit of Richard B. Myers dated
September 17, 1986. (R. 37.) The Power Companies' Reply Memorandum contains the
following reference to Myers' "Additional Undisputed Material Facts": "Myers also proffered

Paragraph 6 of the "Statement of Facts" refers to the July 12, 1991 agreement between
Grace and Myers (the "Joint Venture Agreement"). Appellees characterize the agreement as one
to compensate Myers for his efforts in bringing the parties together. In terms of both breadth
and character, the Joint Venture Agreement is much more. The agreement refers to "the
information provided to Grace officials by Myers regarding the leases" and the efforts of Myers
that resulted in both Myers and Grace entering into the option agreements to acquire the leases.2
One of the express purposes of the agreement was stated as follows:
Grace and Myers & Co. wish to set out the terms and conditions governing their
respective rights and obligations regarding the Leases and Other Property and
under the Option Agreements.
Joint Venture Agreement at 2. (R. 83.) In short, the Joint Venture Agreement is not properly
summarized as an agreement to compensate Myers for his efforts in bringing the parties
together.
Paragraph 10 of the "Statement of Facts" implies that Grace was discussing a possible
joint venture with Andalex until sometime in 1984, when Grace made a definite determination
not to go forward with the joint venture. None of Andalex's citations to the record support this
conclusion. To the contrary, Grace always had an interest in the development of the leases in
the context of a joint venture with Andalex. Grace understood that if Andalex decided to pursue

his own "additional undisputed material facts." MPM does not dispute those additional facts for
purposes of this motion." Third Party Defendants' Reply Memorandum in Response to Myers'
Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment at 2. (R. 848.)
2

R. 83.

2

the leases after reviewing the data supplied by Grace and the Power Companies regarding the
leases, Andalex would contact Grace to discuss a course of action. Andalex did decide to pursue
the leases after reviewing the data, but never advised Grace. Instead, it began negotiating
directly with the Power Companies to the exclusion of Grace and Myers.3
ARGUMENT

POINT I:

THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IS NO BAR TO THE PROPOSED
AMENDED CLAIM BECAUSE THE CLAIM RELATED BACK TO THE
DATE OF THE ORIGINAL.

Appellees argue that the partnership claim contained in the proposed amended
counterclaim does not relate back to the original contract claim because the agreements
underlying the two claims "are different and distinct, and therefore will require different
elements of proof." Brief of Appellees at 18. Appellees failed to say how the two agreements
"are different and distinct," and fail to articulate the "different elements of proof that will be
required.
In contrast, Myers pointed out in his opening brief that the allegations supporting both
the original contract claim and the proposed amended counterclaim are essentially identical.4

3

This precise factual dispute arose in the context of Andalex's Second Motion for
Summary Judgment. Paragraph 10 of the Statement of Facts in the Brief of Appellees is
identical to 112 of the "Statement of Material and Undisputed Facts" in Andalex's Memorandum
in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 637) When, in his Memorandum in
Opposition to Andalex's Motion for Summary Judgment, Myers responded that the fact statement
is incorrect, Andalex conceded the point. See Andalex's Reply Memorandum in Support of its
Motion for Summary Judgment at 4, 112. (R. 866.)
4

See Brief of Appellants at 15-16.

3

The same discussions between the parties serve as the basis for both claims. Through the
proposed amended counterclaim, Myers simply sought leave to attach a different legal meaning
to the same words, a legal meaning made viable by this Court's October 3, 1990 decision in
Shire Development v. Frontier Investments, 799 P.2d 221 (1990).
In Ringwood v. Foreign Auto Works, Inc., 786 P.2d 1350 (Utah App. 1990), this Court
held that an amendment related back to the date of the original complaint in part "because the
amendment was based on a similar claim arising out of the same general transaction. . . . " Id.
at 1360. At a minimum, the same can be said of Myers' proposed amendment. It was a similar
claim arising out of the exact same discussions. To the extent the trial court based its decision
on Andalex's statute of limitations argument, the trial court erred.
POINT H:

NEITHER THE UTAH STATUTE OF FRAUDS NOR THE BROKER
LICENSING LAWS BARS THE PROPOSED AMENDED
COUNTERCLAIM.

In an effort to fit the facts of this case into the Utah Statute of Frauds and the broker
licensing laws, Appellees characterize the agreement between Andalex and Myers as "an
agreement to compensate Myers for acting as a finder." Myers characterizes the agreement as
one to share in the profits from a coal mine. One sentence descriptions of the agreement,
however, do nothing to advance an understanding of its true nature.
A copy of the Joint Venture Agreement is in the record.5 Some of its provisions which
shed light on its nature include the reference to the efforts of Myers that resulted in both Myers

5

R. 82-108.
4

and Grace entering into the option agreements to acquire the leases. The agreement states that
it is its purpose "to set out the terms and conditions governing. . .[Grace's and Myers']
respective rights and obligations regarding the Leases and Other Property and under the Option
Agreements." Joint Venture Agreement at 2. (R. 83.) The agreement provides that if the
options to acquire the leases were exercised, Myers would be entitled to an undivided interest
in the leases.6 The parties agreed that Grace would have the "full power to manage, develop,
mine and operate the Property acquired under each option agreement, including any interest
owned by Myers & Co. . . . " Id. at 5. (R. 86.) Pursuant to the agreement Myers is required
to "make 3% of any payments required of the Buyers under the Option Agreements and the
assignments contemplated thereby." Id.
In short, it is inappropriate to characterize the Joint Venture Agreement as "an agreement
to compensate Myers for acting as a finder." Brief of Appellees at 20. Properly viewed,
neither the Statute of Frauds nor the broker licensing laws apply to bar the claims based on the
agreement.
POINT HI: THERE WAS NO UNDUE DELAY IN SEEKING LEAVE TO FILE THE
AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM.
Appellees argue that the trial court was correct in denying leave to amend the
counterclaim because the motion seeking leave was "unduly dilatory." Brief of Appellees at 22.
What Appellees failed to address is what constitutes undue delay. Myers' counterclaim was filed
on July 22, 1988. Two years later, after extensive discovery conducted in several states,

6

Joint Venture Agreement at 4. (R. 85.)
5

Andalex filed its first Motion for Summary Judgment on August 23, 1990. The hearing on the
motion was held on February 4, 1991. It was at the hearing on the motion that Myers made a
verbal motion to amend his counterclaim to add the partnership claim. Given the complexity
of the case, the relatively large scope of discovery and the complete absence of prejudice, it
cannot be said that Myers was "unduly dilatory" in seeking leave to amend.
Moreover, the partnership claim was made viable only after the October 3, 1990 decision
in Shire Development v. Frontier Investments, 799 P.2d 221 (1990). The question resolved by
Shire Development, apparently a question of first impression in Utah, is whether oral joint
venture agreements to share in profits arising from a collateral contract concerning real estate
are void under the Statute of Frauds. Until the decision in Shire Development, Myers' ability
to bring the proposed amended counterclaim in Utah was uncertain. To the extent the trial court
denied Myers' motion to amend on the basis of undue delay, the trial court erred.
POINT IV: APPLIED IN LIGHT OF THEIR PURPOSE, THE BROKER LICENSING
LAWS DO NOT BAR MYERS' CLAIM.
In arguing that the trial court was correct in concluding that Myers' contract and quasicontract claims are barred by the broker licensing laws, Appellees claim that the purpose of the
laws can only be considered if one ignores "the clear and unambiguous terms" of the statutes.
Brief of Appellees at 29-30. Appellees argue that because the terms of the statutes are clear,
the statutes' purpose should be gleaned from their language and not from the Utah Supreme
Court's interpretation of their purpose.

6

The difficulty with Appellees' argument is that the statutory language does not reveal a
purpose.

Accordingly, Myers looked to the Utah Supreme Court's opinion in Global

Recreation, Inc. v. Cedar Hills Development Co., 614 P.2d 155 (1980) for guidance. In Global
Recreation the Supreme Court concluded:
The purpose of those provisions is not to protect real estate developers who seek
relief from their own contractual obligations; (footnote omitted) rather, it is for
the protection of members of the public who rely on licensed real estate brokers
and salesmen to perform tasks that require a high degree of honesty and integrity.
Id. at 158.
Myers does not ask the Court to construe or interpret the language of the statutes. The
point of the argument is simply that application of the statutes must be tempered by their
purpose. Application of the statutes under the facts and circumstances of this case does not
serve their purpose. The public is not being protected from unscrupulous real estate brokers.
Rather, real estate "developers" (Appellees) are seeking relief from their own contractual
obligations.
An example illustrates the point. Assume A learns of the availability of lucrative coal
leases, but lacks the capital to buy and develop the leases. A uses his expertise in the industry
and spends thousands of hours researching the feasibility of mining operations on the leased
property and presents his findings to B.

B is in the business of mining coal and has the

necessary capital to purchase and develop the leases. A and B decide to enter into a joint
venture to further explore and eventually purchase the leases. The agreement provides that A
is to be compensated, in part from the profits of the coal mine, for his "leg work." B is to be

7

compensated for his capital investment. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that the
broker licensing laws should apply to bar A's claim based on the agreement. Likewise, under
the parallel circumstances of the present matter, the laws should not apply.
Andalex argued for a literal, rigid application of the statute and the trial court apparently
agreed. Viewed in light of the purpose of the statute, however, it is apparent that such an
application is inappropriate and the trial court erred.
POINT V:

UNDER SHIRE DEVELOPMENT v. FRONTIER INVESTMENTS THE
JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT IS NOT WITHIN THE STATUTE OF
FRAUDS.

As noted, Shire Development v. Frontier Investments, 799 P.2d 221 (Utah App. 1990),
stands for the proposition that an oral joint venture agreement to share in the profits arising from
a collateral contract is not within the Statute of Frauds, even if the collateral contract is within
the Statute of Frauds.7 Appellees failed to address the impact of Shire Development on this case
in their opposing brief. Simply put, when Andalex agreed to assume the obligations of the Joint
Venture Agreement, Myers and Andalex embarked on a joint venture to share in any profits
arising from the leases. Under Shire Development, such an agreement is not within the Statute
of Frauds and the trial court's apparent conclusion to the contrary is error.

7

Shire Development v. Frontier Investments, 799 P.2d 221, 224 (Utah App. 1990).
8

POINT VI: BECAUSE THE FINDER OF FACT COULD HAVE INFERRED FRAUD
BASED ON THE UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE, THE FRAUD CLAIM
SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED AS A MATTER OF LAW.
In response to Myers' arguments concerning the fraud claim, Appellees simply conclude
that there was no evidence of a knowing misrepresentation. Of course, Andalex did not admit
that it lacked the intent to perform its agreement. Accordingly, there was no easy proof of
Andalex's lack of intent.
Rather, Myers produced undisputed, circumstantial evidence from which the intent to
deceive could have been inferred. First, it was conceded for purposes of Andalex's motions that
Andalex agreed to compensate Myers in accordance with the Joint Venture Agreement. It was
also undisputed that the promise to compensate Myers was made by Mr. Anderson, the president
of Andalex. Finally, it was undisputed that Mr. Smith, the senior officer at Andalex with whom
Mr. Anderson was working most closely on the project, never heard anything from Mr.
Anderson regarding the promise. According to Mr. Smith, he would have heard of the promise
had Mr. Anderson intended that Andalex would be compensating Myers.
Based on this undisputed evidence, and the evidence concerning the sudden manner in
which Andalex excluded Grace and Myers from its negotiations with the Power Companies, the
finder of fact could have inferred the intent to deceive. Under Galloway v. Afco Development
Corp., Ill P.2d 506, 509 (Utah App. 1989), the circumstantial evidence was enough to avoid
summary judgment and the trial court erred in concluding otherwise.

9

POINT VH: THE POWER COMPANIES' BREACH OF THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF
GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING RESULTED FROM THEIR
ACTIONS INCONSISTENT WITH THE JUSTIFIED EXPECTATIONS OF
MYERS.
The Power Companies correctly point out that Myers agreed that his compensation was
to come from the purchaser of the leases, not the Power Companies. The next step of their
argument is based on misunderstanding of the law. The Power Companies claim that because
they had no express obligation to compensate Myers, it cannot be said that they had an implied
obligation to protect the interest of Myers in receiving compensation.
One of the most recent pronouncements on the law in this area is found in St. Benedict's
Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 811 P.2d 194 (Utah 1991), in which the Court noted:
Under the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, each party impliedly promises
that he will not intentionally or purposefully do anything which will destroy or
injure the other parties' right to receive the fruits of the contract. (Citations
omitted)

To comply with his obligation to perform a contract in good faith, a party's
actions must be consistent with the agreed common purpose and the justified
expectations of the other party. The purpose, intentions and expectations of the
parties should be determined by considering the contract language and the course
of dealings between and conduct of the parties.
811 P.2d at 199-200.
One of the "agreed common purposes" of the parties was that Myers would be
compensated for his efforts. As fully outlined in Myers opening brief, the Power Companies
acted in a manner that frustrated this purpose.

10

The Power Companies dismiss St. Benedict's as factually dissimilar. They claim that in
St. Benedict's, Mthe defendant was accused of violating the covenant of good faith because it had
taken affirmative action in contravention of express terms of the agreement." Brief of Appellees
at 46. The Power Companies misread the case. The holding of the case on the pertinent point
is as follows:
Here, in addition to the hospital's express promises, the language in the
agreements and the parties' conduct indicate an intent to cooperate in acquiring
and retaining tenants for both of the buildings leased by the development
company. The alleged facts indicate that the hospital did not proceed in a manner
consistent with the justified expectations of the development company or the
intentions of the parties. The hospital's encouragement of a competing office
building suggests that there may have been a breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing.
811 P.2d at 200 (Emphasis added).
The undisputed facts8 in this matter indicate that the Power Companies "did not proceed
in a manner consistent with the justified expectations" of Myers, expectations developed from
the language of the agreement and the course of dealing between the parties. Accordingly, it
was error to conclude as a matter of law that there was no breach of the implied covenant. The

8

In footnote 37 of the Brief of Appellees it is suggested that there is no proper support
for the assertion that the Power Companies had insisted that Grace compensate Myers.
Appellees argue that Myers' citation to his verified interrogatory answers does not meet the
evidentiary requirements of U.R.Civ.P Rule 56(e). Prior to the filing of their brief, the Power
Companies never suggested this factual assertion was improperly supported. The assertion that
the Power Companies insisted that Grace compensate Myers is found in Myers' Memorandum
in Opposition to Motion of Third Party Defendants for Summary Judgment at 5. (R. 830.) In
their reply memorandum, the Power Companies expressly stated that they did not dispute the
factual assertion. Third Party Defendants' Reply Memorandum in Response to Myers'
Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment at 2. (R. 848.)

11

trial court's decision should be reversed and the matter should be remanded for further
proceedings.
DATED this *Z> day of February, 1993.
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN

CRAIG G. ADAMSON
ERIC P. LEE
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